- The fact that no clear conclusions could be reached yet, and that the sample size achieved was only 50% of the initial target highlights, either just how hard this is to do and/or, actually it’s much closer than they thought. For example, if one payment type had substantially more costly than another it’d surely have been highlighted
- The low response rate and the bias to large merchants is likely to leave the survey open to criticism
- More detail is required to give comfort – for example, the cost seems to suggest some significant missing costs (such as CIT fees, bank cash handling fees, etc)
February 19, 2014 by Leave a Comment
Today the European Commission released its long awaited study into the cost of merchants accepting cash and card payments. A copy of the preliminary presentation can be found here. It’s long awaited for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is supposed to finally address the issue of comparing actual costs. Whilst there have been many studies in the past that looked at this, nearly all had a flaw. Those commissioned by one of the interested parties had such inherent biases that it rendered them almost unusable. For example, the anti-cards lobby conveniently chose to inhabit a magic kingdom where labour was free and cash magically appeared and disappeared from stores, free of charge! Academic studies have typically been too academic – lots of interesting formulae, but not grounded in reality. The Commission set out, once and for all, to get a definitive answer. That’s the second reason why it is important. The Commission has taken what many believe as an “anti-card” stance, with a view that cards are unnecessarily expensive. At the same time, they are actively promoting electronic payments as paper/cash is costly and inefficient, but not taking into account some fundamental differences, such as cards are a commercial business, whilst cash is supplied in essence by the State (I know, I know – that sentence is a whole debate in itself!). The study then was supposed to create an unambiguous fact-base. The more cynical of us has wondered what happens if the study presents data that is contrary to the stance of the Commission, and that could contradict the last decade of activity from the Commission in this area! The programme has not been without it’s problems. A previous study commissioned a few years ago has never been released, and has been perceived as not reaching the answer the Commission wanted. This is primarily because the consultancy selected is highly regarded for their integrity and knowledge – by not sharing anything about the study, the market has reached it’s own conclusions. In the introduction to the document today though was a comment that it had “Unsatisfactory methodological recommendations.” Secondly, the request for a subsequent study was woefully underfunded. Unsurprisingly, the target number of merchants to study was not met by a considerable margin. This isn’t to criticize the firm that won the tender, more that the opportunity to do this right was never there. Alot of preamble – what did we learn? Not much. I wasn’t able to attend the presentation, so there is – literally – only the afore mentioned deck to study. For me the initial take-aways are:
April 18, 2011 by Leave a Comment
Over the weekend I read an open letter by Senator Durbin to JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon regarding interchange fees. In the letter Senator Durbin sets outs his arguments for why the Senate was compelled to introduce debit interchange regulation, which overall makes a very interesting reading. One paragraph especially caught my eye (my Bold Italics highlighting): “Last year Congress decided that there should be reasonable regulatory constraints placed on Visa and MasterCard to ensure that they cannot use their market dominance to funnel excessive interchange fees to the nation’s biggest banks. A strong bipartisan majority supported my amendment, which said that if Visa and MasterCard are going to fix fee rates on behalf of banks with over $10 billion in assets, those rates must be reasonable and proportional to the cost of processing the transaction. It is important to make clear that if Chase wants to set and charge its own fees in a competitive market environment, the amendment does not regulate those fees. The only regulated fees are those fees that banks let card networks fix on their behalf.” This got me thinking… does this mean that the issuers are free to introduce a new fee, which they could charge the acquirers in lieu of interchange, lets say an “authorisation” fee? Of course, any issuer who goes first faces to be at a competitive disadvantage to others, at least initially. The industry players don’t have to collude to raise prices with various signalling techniques available to them and given the market clout of the largest issuers. I am sure there would be other challenges (e.g. technical, etc.), but is this completely out of the question? Why? What do you think?